Central to the current global financial crisis is the endogenous risk generating and amplified within the banking system and credit market. In the past boom and bust cycle caused by excessive speculation is localized and caused by exogenous risk.
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trade among them and often hold directional view trading position on their books.
One estimates that the total credit-default swap (CDS) market where investors supposed to buy insurance against corporate default had its total notional principle around $55 trillions (trn) in 2007. This is may be colossal. But in fact, CDS market is just a small part of worldwide derivative market estimated to be USD600 trn or 11
times world output at the end of 2007 as surveyed by Bank for International Settlement (BIS). 3 . In essence, investment bankers would selectively hold or sell down their loans and credit swap according to their risk appetite and capital constraint to maximize its return. In short, investment banks' securitization process becomes one gigantic credit creation chain until no one really knows who is the end borrower as a real person.
As banks extend credit easily to households regardless of their creditworthy in pursuing for high return and hope to pass along their risks to others, bubbles are forming in housing and other asset classes as everyone -from borrower to broker, originating bank to rating agency, from investment bank to investor -tries to make profits and speculates along the chain of credit formation. The US Debt to GDP ratio by every sector, especially households and financial, has soared as depicted in Fig. 3 . Moreover, US GSE or Government-sponsored-enterprises (e.g. Freddie Mac, It appears MTM has been tested over time. So, why does MTM matter now?
This global financial crisis is not typical crisis. Normally, the boom and bust cycle from speculative excesses is intensely concentrated in one area and may have limited contagion to another region. After securitization and decentralized global financial system, this becomes truly the first global bubble and burst crisis. The turmoil impacts are now spreading everywhere and cascading its damage to interlocked balance sheets of finance and non-finance firms. The credit market has become dysfunctional and takes banks and other financial markets spirally downward 6 IAS is the International Accounting Standards. IAS 39 is the standard for financial instruments to be recognized and measurement in fair value principle. For more technical discussion see Fujoka, Seko and Hoontrakul (2008) and stressed market, everyone becomes extremely risk averse as every banks' balance sheets may be in shamble. Vicious cycle of shrinking balance sheets has negatively feedback into the system. Credit squeezes and liquidity dissipates.
The solution to ease the liquidity thirst and credit scare is interestingly coming from a small European country at the end of Sept. 08. Irish banks came back from the brink of collapse by the corrective policy response to guarantee all banks' liabilitiesretail depositors and wholesale fund providers for the period of two years. Fig. 10 displays the effective of the policy as the CDS spread plunged. Since the operating condition has been very difficult worldwide, the only way to re-capitalize these banks is either to be nationalized in some degrees or to sell its preference (quasi-debt) equity that basically guaranteed by its respected government. In other words, the adverse selection (e.g. which bank is going to bust) was resolved by the third party guarantee -its sovereign nation. The following week, UK had pursued the Irish scheme with some modification of its own for capital injection in a form of preference equity and market based fee. Many oil tankers, for example, were at sea without destination by the mid of Oct. 08
because few buyers have accessed to credit and cash to fill their obligation in the midst of the falling prices. Even OPEC announced its production cut by 1.5 million barrels per day in the third week of Oct. The oil price is still plummeting as shown in Fig. 11a . Metal, coal and corn are also at 30 to 50 % discount from their peaks in matter of weeks as depicted in Fig. 11b , c. Steel, fertilizer, business outsourcing, real estate property and other assets are sharing the same faith as no cash or credit is going around. The MTM losses from its outstanding position based on these illiquid traded prices must be written down on the firms' books. Facing tremendous equity wipe out, many firms may be forced to bankrupt. In nutshell, when banks find it difficult to borrow, so does everyone else. And when bank does get their funding from the governments' support and the credit spread narrows or stabilizes, bank still has a tough time to lend in this unfriendly environment and distress period.
In sum, the public coordination failures have aggravated the crisis at the onset. Fed was fixing the wrong cause with its ad hoc approach and reluctant Capital Fig. 12 a and b. One should harness positive externalities to promote virtuous circle rather than otherwise. Below are its implications and discussion on the policy responses.
First, fire sale of asset depressed price and decrease liquidity. This case may be for Thailand when BoT imposed strict for banks to dispose all non-performing loans and asset (NPL/NPLA) within 10 years regardless of market condition. Hence, the liquidity is constrained. Simple allowance for reclassification in accounting and some relaxation on some "rare circumstance" cases may selectively resolve this issue.
Moreover, the land re-valuation in annual basis may be changed to every two-three years or use the moving average of 5 years as the new basis for banks' book. This may mitigate the risk of mis-pricing these real estate holdings in illiquid market.
Thus, the balance sheet damage may be limited. Banks capitalize on their skill to originate loans, while the states become the guarantee of the last resort. Risk based premium and risk-sharing scheme should make both banks and agencies have incentive compatible. It is far easier to stimulate the economy with credit extension than without it because of money multiplier effect.
Last, but not least, all fiscal stimulus measures need public funding and commitment -both on and off balance sheet -burden to all taxpayers. Public finance would always "crowd out" private investment finance in some senses as both are competing to expand their balance sheet. On one hand, a "well judged" fiscal stimulus for productive public investment with a clear beginning and end (e.g. mass transit system, energy conservation investment, water irrigation system for agriculture, etc.) may be good to revive its economy. This pro-productivity growth policy, beyond central bank's control, can ensure our long wave cycle of peace and prosperity. On the other hand, it is easy to spend today and worry about this later, As the result of this turmoil, mostly banks in US and Europe has written off more than $ 600 billion as shown in Table 2 . Trillion dollars debt more overhang as indicated in Table 3 . Only Portugal and Greece housing problem alone is equal to US Subprime 
VI. Conclusion:
The current global financial crisis is not a typical crisis with simple economic contraction. The crisis is caused by the endogenous risk generating and amplified within the banking system and credit market. In the past boom and bust cycle caused by excessive speculation is localized and caused by exogenous risk. This may be easily contained. In the past, another strong balance sheet financial institutions, rich 
